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MANAGING UNCERTAINTY: 
LESSONS FROM XENOPHON’S RETREAT 
 
Abstract. Propositions on dynamic capabilities and organizational politics are 
developed from management literature and are then evaluated using case analysis.  
The goal is to identify complementary aspects of these perspectives to change 
from an ancient example that can offer insights for management thought and 
practice today.  Initially chronicled by Xenophon, roughly 10,000 Greek 
mercenaries spent over two years confronting demanding circumstances as they 
fought their way into and out of ancient Persia.  The mercenaries’ response to 
changing circumstances offers a unique case for integrating literature on 
responses to uncertainty that range between rational and haphazard explanations.  
The analysis suggests uncertainty management is a complex phenomenon 
imperfectly represented by existing models.     
 
INTRODUCTION  
Uncertainty is an intrinsic component of competition.  The need for organizations to cope 
with or adapt to uncertainty represents an early focus of organizational research (e.g., Alchain, 
1950; Coase, 1937; Schumpeter, 1934; Thompson, 1967).  The continuing relevance of 
managing uncertainty is evident with current business researchers and journalists often 
discussing the rapid pace of change or increasingly dynamic circumstances organizations face 
today (e.g., D’Aveni, Dagnino & Smith, 2010; Stanton, 2011).  Resulting competition among 
organizations is often described as ‘survival of the fittest’ with continuous improvement 
becoming a minimum standard for remaining relevant (Tegarden, Hatfield & Echols, 1999).  
Accordingly, there is a need for research to examine competing perspectives for explaining 
organizational change (Graetz & Smith, 2010).   
While the nature of competition evolves, lessons from history can provide insights for 
organizations today (Carmeli & Markman, 2011) and the reliability of learning can be increased 
by examining critical events (March, Sproull & Tamuz, 1991).  The history of military exploits 
from ancient Greece provides one example of the impact of uncertainty on organizational 
survival.  A specific circumstance that has been called “one of the great adventures in human 
history” (Durant, 1939: 460-61) is examined.  It involves a Greek mercenary force that served 
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with Cyrus, who contested with his brother Antaxerxes for the throne of the Persian Empire 
around 401 BC (Warner, 1949).  Following the battle of Cunaxa where Cyrus was killed by the 
forces of his brother, the Greek mercenaries’ gamble for riches died with their sponsor 
(Waterfield, 2006) and they ended up fighting their way both into and out of Persia (see Figure 
1) over roughly two years and 2,000 miles (Lee, 2007). 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
The experience of the Greek mercenaries in Persia was recorded by Xenophon.  
Xenophon was from Athens and a contemporary of the philosopher Socrates whom Xenophon 
consulted about joining the Persian expedition.  Socrates advised Xenophon to consult the oracle 
at Delphi and later chastised Xenophon when he learned the question involved ensuring a safe 
return and not asking whether Xenophon should go (Waterfield, 2006).  Xenophon wrote 
multiple books that have survived and his ideas have had an enduring impact (Lee, 2007).  For 
example, Alexander the Great was familiar with Xenophon’s work and his invasion and 
subsequent conquering of Persia was potentially inspired by it (Hirsch, 1985).  While the Greek 
population had a high awareness of conflicts with Persia, including the defeat of Persian invaders 
at Marathon, not much was known about Persians and Xenophon took advantage of his firsthand 
experience and the resulting curiosity to make Persia prominent in his many written works 
(Hirsch, 1985). 
The remainder of the article is organized into four sections.  First, relevant management 
theory is reviewed and propositions developed for two different perspectives of managing 
uncertainty and change.  The goal is to identify complementary aspects of the perspectives while 
evaluating their relevance for management research and practice.  Second, the case method as it 
is applied to the current study is explained.  Third, the case involving the Greek mercenaries is 
presented and analyzed.  Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of implications and 
opportunities for additional research. 
THEORY AND PROPOSITIONS 
Uncertainty drives the search for solutions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and 
perspectives on approaching change range from rational and logical to the more haphazard 
(Graetz & Smith, 2010).  To improve the understanding of change, propositions are developed 
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from two different perspectives.  First, a rational perspective assumes organizations are 
purposeful and able to adapt (Graetz & Smith, 2010).  Consistent with this perspective dynamic 
capability research has developed to explain organization responses to uncertainty (e.g., 
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, 2009; Winter, 2003).  Second, a political perspective of 
organizations assumes that organizational change and adaptation require effective political skills 
(Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Ferris et al., 2000; Pfeffer, 1992).  According to this perspective, 
organizational politics play a larger role compared to the attention it has received in management 
research (Butcher & Clarke, 2003).  In the following sections, dynamic capabilities and 
organizational politics literature are summarized and associated propositions developed for 
managing uncertainty. 
Dynamic Capabilities 
An offshoot of resource based theory (Barney, 1991) dynamic capabilities explicitly 
recognizes that organizational resource profiles are not static (Kor & Mahoney, 2000).  Dynamic 
capabilities seeks to explain the organizational processes that respond to both external events and 
internal pressures and enable adaptation to changing market conditions (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000, Lavie, 2006). While the role of dynamic capabilities is to transform organizational 
resources so they remain relevant (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009), they stem from antecedent 
processes that alter an organization’s resource base that becomes a valuable resource in its own 
right (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997).  Capabilities involve shared meaning or tacit relationships 
that facilitate task accomplishment and they both enable and limit strategies available to 
organizations. 
An example of how capabilities limit organizations relates to organizational inertia, or 
accumulated experience interfering with opportunity recognition (Hannan & Freeman, 1984).  
When change occurs, resulting uncertainty can increase an organization’s risk through resource 
misallocation (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) at a time when it can least be afforded.  As a 
result, resource management needs to be carefully attended and aligned with an organization’s 
external environment (Sirmon, Hitt & Ireland, 2007).  The extent of resource misallocation likely 
depends on whether associated change is evolutionary (competence enhancing) or revolutionary 
(competence destroying).   
Evolutionary change reinforces existing paradigms, and provides organizations a way to 
improve performance with existing methods.  Building on existing knowledge allows 
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organizations to increase efficiency by achieving similar outputs with fewer inputs (Grewal & 
Slotegraaf, 2007), and associated learning can lead to greater competence and improved 
outcomes (Levitt & March, 1988).  As a result, responses to evolutionary change reinforce 
efforts to more efficiently use existing resources.  However, limiting the search for 
improvements to existing practices creates path dependency (Kogut & Zander, 1996) as the focus 
stays on solving existing problems reinforces existing paradigms. 
Revolutionary change meanwhile represents a greater challenge (Atuahene-Gima, 2005; 
Burgelman, 1983), because it is more likely to make current resources obsolete (Stieglitz & 
Heine, 2007).  Further, existing resources likely limit an organization’s ability to search for new 
solutions (Stuart & Podolny, 1996).  The knowledge and skills needed following discontinuous 
change are different from prior processes, reducing the likelihood that needed changes will be 
found and adopted (Atuahene-Gima, 2005).  A possible exception involves complementary 
resources, or interactions between new and familiar resources that often become critical for 
continued success when an organization’s environment changes (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; King, 
Covin & Hegarty, 2003).  With revolutionary change, to the extent that existing resources can be 
combined in new resource interactions, successful adaption is more likely because it makes 
familiar resources more effective. 
The implication of the proceeding discussion on different types of change is that resource 
endowments likely influence organizational responses to uncertainty.  A paradox results where 
pursuit of evolutionary change is needed to remain competitive within an existing paradigm, but 
the path dependence of successful evolutionary development makes an organization more 
susceptible to revolutionary change or new and unfamiliar paradigms.  Indeed, processes and 
resources contributing to organizational survival in stable environments are often detrimental in 
dynamic environments (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003).  Therefore, the following relationships are 
proposed: 
Proposition 1a: When current conditions resemble the past, organizations focus on 
increasing the efficiency of using current resources. 
Proposition 1b: When facing uncertain conditions, organizations attempt to develop 
complementary resources that improve the effectiveness of familiar resources. 
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Organizational Politics 
Politics relate to the observable, but often veiled, actions people use to enhance their 
influence or power (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Pfeffer, 1992).  The predominant focus of 
research on organizational politics until recently has focused on its negatives, but politics can be 
essential in managing uncertainty and forming constructive responses to change (Ammeter, et 
al., 2002; Butcher & Clarke, 2003).  While politics can create an internal focus at the expense of 
the external environment that drives change (Graetz & Smith, 2010), politics can help reduce 
fragmentation by providing a known arena for sharing and interpreting information (Zahra, 
Nielsen & Bogner, 1999).  The ability to share information can be crucial during important 
decisions that generally require the involvement of more people (Pfeffer, 1992).   
In times of rapid and unpredictable change, politics also injects randomness that may be 
critical to adaptation that avoids destroying the underlying organization (Brown & Eisenhardt, 
1998; Pfeffer, 1992).  Politics can diffuse power in an organization and allow networks to 
identify and apply underutilized resources to problems (Morris, Kuratko & Covin, 2008; Zahra, 
et al., 1999).  While political activity can help to manage relationships (Butcher & Clarke, 2003), 
achieving positive outcomes requires political skill embodied by social awareness of effective 
arguments and communicating them well (Ferris et al., 2000; Pfeffer, 1992).   
In other words, political skill requires the use of influence. The Greek philosopher 
Aristotle outlined three facets of influence: ethos, pathos, and logos (Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001).  
While the elements are interrelated, ethos relates to a moral imperative and the credibility of the 
speaker, pathos appeals to an audience’s sympathies to make an emotional connection, and logos 
relates to rational reasoning.  We learn teamwork to coordinate activities and defer to authority in 
achieving common goals (Pfeffer, 1992), and, next to trust, the crucial element for teamwork is a 
common goal (Kotter, 1996).  Influencing people to reach common goals leads to political 
behaviors, such as leading by example, promoting a vision, or arguing the value of organization 
(Ammeter, et al. 2002)—concepts directly related to management.   
Managers serve as the basis for organizational growth and adaptation by identifying 
opportunities that an organization should pursue (Penrose, 1959) and managers need political 
skill in their pursuit of organizational goals (Butcher & Clarke, 2003; Pfeffer, 1992).  Top 
managers are likely to be more skilled at political activity, but increased demands limit their 
ability to pay attention to every issue of importance (Garg, Walters & Priem, 2003).  While 
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managers use scanning to identify threats and for responding to uncertainty (Helfat & 
Raubitschek, 2000), managers are rationally bounded (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992).  For 
example, managers often limit search to information that supports their perspective (Pfeffer, 
1992).  Further, higher political skill likely relates to a heightened awareness of politics or a 
commensurate risk of focusing on internal issues.  One implication of this risk involves top 
managers being less likely to develop and exploit new knowledge (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Zahra, et 
al., 1999).   
Compared with top managers, middle managers exhibit apparent advantages in 
responding to change.  First, middle managers exhibit less lock-in to policies and procedures, 
and they typically display a greater flexibility toward fine tuning established processes 
(Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999; Sayles & Stewart, 1995).  Next, middle managers are closer to and 
are more likely to identify challenges facing an organization (Nohria & Berkley, 1994).  Further, 
with their focus on different areas, middle managers inject divergent thinking into organizations 
(Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997).  As a result, innovation comes primarily from middle managers 
(Kuratko & Goldsby, 2004) and drives a shift in power as influence is gained by managers 
coping with critical organizational problems (Pfeffer, 1992).  The preceding paragraphs suggest 
the ability of managers to effectively respond to uncertainty and change may depend on the 
context or their level in an organization.  Therefore, the following is proposed: 
Proposition 2:  When faced with uncertainty, middle managers are more likely to 
recognize and act on divergent ideas than top management. 
While politics helps in responding to change and getting things done, it comes with a 
price.  Power and influence results from a person’s reputation in getting things done, but the use 
of power to get things done can build animosity (Pfeffer, 1992).  One reason is the use of power 
can be seductive to the point that power becomes its own goal (Simon, 1957), creating a distrust 
of the powerful.  This may help explain attempts to use influence covertly.  The covert use of 
power contributes to internal splits over the control of resources, such as information, that 
diffuses power (Pfeffer, 1992).  The combined effect of these forces is that power is often 
transitory (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997).  Therefore, the following is proposed: 
Proposition 3:  The consistent exercise of power to enact change culminates in 
reduced influence. 
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METHOD  
The research design involves a single-case study founded on theoretical propositions 
(Yin, 1994) to match patterns between a historical event and modern theoretical concepts 
(Campbell, 1975; March et al., 1991).  Managing uncertainty has been long regarded as an 
organizational challenge, and, while a single-case approach has limitations, its use is justified on 
three grounds.  First, the challenges that Xenophon faced with the Greek mercenaries involved a 
unique circumstance of how a large organization responded to threats to its survival.  Second, the 
dramatic circumstances of the Greek mercenary force in Persia contributed to a large body of 
information for building a case.  Finally, it is neither appropriate nor practical to design a 
research study around similar circumstances (Zimbardo, 1973).  The case summary was 
developed from available documentation, including translations of Xenophon’s memoir (Warner, 
1949) on the experiences of the Greek mercenaries.  Additional documentation that evaluates 
Xenophon’s historical record and provides context for the mercenary force was also reviewed in 
developing the case.  An analysis of the developed case summary is then used to assess the 
research propositions. 
CASE SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 
Case summary 
The setting is on the heels of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) that resulted in a 
Spartan hegemony (404-371 BC) over the Greek city-states, including Athens (Jones, 2008).  
Following the Peloponnesian War, large numbers of unemployed mercenaries provided the 
foundation to build an army and Cyrus built an army using Greek mercenaries as its core to 
contest his brother Antaxerxes for the Persian throne (Hutchinson, 2000).  The case summary of 
the surrounding events is presented in four segments beginning with the prelude leading to the 
battle of Cuxana that includes a discussion of the Greek commanders, because their fate plays a 
prominent role in the fate of the Greek mercenaries. 
Prelude 
 Cyrus joined roughly 10,400 Greek hoplites1 and 2,500 peltasts2 from different units and 
commanders with his Persian forces (Lee, 2007; Waterford, 2006). The larger force of Persian 
                                                     
1 Hoplites were heavy infantry that fought in a phalanx formation of overlapping shields that presented a wall of 
bristling spears, and were formed from middle class Greeks able to afford the needed equipment.   
2 Peltasts were light infantry that had lower status and fought as skirmishers armed with a wicker shield and javelins. 
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soldiers was commanded by Ariaeus (Warner, 1949).  A Greek general’s status depended on the 
number of men they led, and command of Cyrus’s Greek forces was initially given to Xenias 
who led 4,000 mostly Arcadian hoplites that were already in Ionia (see Figure 1) with Cyrus as 
garrison troops policing urban centers (Lee, 2007).  The remainder of the Greek force was spread 
across three groups and five generals.  First, Proxenus, Socrates (not philosopher), and 
Sophaenetus commanded an additional 3,000 hoplites recruited from across Greece, and it was 
Proxenus that recruited Xenophon (Waterford, 2006).  Second, Clearchus, a Spartan, 
commanded a mixed force of 1,000 hoplites, 800 peltasts, 200 archers and 40 cavalry (Lee, 
2007).  Third, Menon led 1,000 hoplites and 500 peltasts from a force of 2,000 hoplites Cyrus 
had loaned to Aristippus for use in Thessalia (Lee, 2007).  After the majority of Xenias’s men 
defected to Clearchus, Xenias deserted Cyrus and Clearchus became the leading Greek general 
(Waterfield, 2006).  Additional reinforcements brought the Greek force to its culminating size as 
they marched into the interior of Persia with the understanding they were defending Cyrus from 
a rival satrap, Tissaphernes (Warner, 1949).   
The Greek leaders contributed to a sense of disorder with animosity serving as a 
dominant feature of their relationship.  Clearchus, the ablest of the Greek commanders (Hirsch, 
1985), had been banished and sentenced to death by Sparta after he fought a Spartan force sent to 
retrieve him for abuses in Byzantine (Lee, 2006; Waterfield, 2006).  Clearchus was also the only 
Greek general who likely knew that Cyrus intended to overthrow his brother and not simply to 
protect his satrap from Tissaphernes (Hirsch, 1985; Warner, 1949).  While less colorful and 
experienced, the other Greek generals likely came from circumstances offering limited options.  
The only other experienced Greek commander was Menon, a clear rival to Clearchus.  On the 
march to Cuxana, Proxenus had to interpose his army between the armies of Clearchus and 
Menon to keep them from coming to blows, after Clearchus struck one of a Menon’s soldiers and 
another responded by throwing an axe at Clearchus (Lee, 2007; Waterfield, 2006).  With this 
background, it is little wonder there were problems maintaining control of the larger mercenary 
force.   
Problems became evident early as the mercenaries went on strike for twenty days when 
they suspected Cyrus intended to use the army for more than protecting his satrap from 
Tissaphernes (Warner, 1949).  The further the mercenaries marched into Persia, the clearer 
Cyrus’s true intentions must have become.  The strike came to an end after Clearchus gave a 
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speech where he wept in front of his troops saying he would never betray fellow Greeks for the 
friendship of barbarians (Hirsch, 1985; Lee, 2007).  At the same time, Clearchus assured Cyrus 
he would get things under control and Cyrus rewarded him for getting the mercenaries moving 
again (Lee, 2007).  From this, one can conclude the Greek mercenaries were deceived by both 
their employer and leadership.  
Other factors contributing to problems with discipline resulted from the nature of the 
mercenary force itself.  First, the Greeks believed in social mobility or a shared belief that 
anyone could become general, contributing to a sense of individualism (Hutchinson, 2000).  This 
is also consistent with developing Greek democratic ideals and the use citizen councils to decide 
on action that was further compounded by the mercenaries being volunteers.  Second, the 
mercenary force had both a formal and informal structure.  Lochos, the formal structure, formed 
military units with selected leaders (Lee, 2007).  Overall, the Greek’s command structure 
enabled initiative by identifying and developing capable leaders (Hutchinson, 2000).  
Meanwhile, informal groups called suskenia shared resources and worked to provide necessities 
(Lee, 2007).  The concept of logistics was not integrated into Greek armies and gave generals 
less control over foraging, or how troops met basic needs (Lee, 2007).  Still, the march into 
Persia gave the disparate Greek mercenary groups crucial experiences in coordinating activities, 
such as marching, making camp, and setting sentries. 
Battle of Cunaxa 
Antaxerxes was aware of Cyrus’s army and made plans to meet him with an even larger 
army.  The decisive event came six months after the Greek mercenaries left Ionia near Cunaxa, 
or present day Fallujah, Iraq (Lee, 2007).  One of Cyrus’s cavalry officers, Pategyas, spotted the 
opposing army during a midday march that included crossing a defensive trench that contributed 
to disarray in Cyrus’s army (Warner, 1949).  With his brother’s army near, Cyrus ordered his 
army to deploy for battle in a process that took considerable time (Lee, 2007).  The Greeks 
deployed on the right of the Cyrus’s army putting their unshielded right side along the Euphrates 
River (Hutchinson, 2000).   
Both armies waited to attack until late afternoon, when the Greek force charged and the 
Persians opposite them retreated.  Meanwhile, the ensuing fight between the Persian forces was 
more difficult with Antaxerxes’ larger army overlapping the army of Cyrus (Hutchinson, 2000).  
Cyrus focused on attacking his brother’s bodyguard creating disorder and allowing Cyrus to 
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wound Antaxerxes before being killed himself (Warner, 1949).  Not aware of Cyrus’s death, the 
Greek force advanced on the Antaxerxes’ remaining forces sending them into retreat.  At the 
conclusion of the day, both sides felt they had won.  The Greeks held the field and suffered few 
casualties, but the Persian cavalry had pillaged the Greek’s camp destroying their supplies 
(Hutchinson, 2000).  The interim result was an uneasy truce. 
After the battle, the Greek mercenaries learned of Cyrus’s death and attempted to retrieve 
success from failure by playing kingmaker, and they offered to make Ariaeus the king.  
However, he refused and ultimately returned to serve Antaxerxes (Waterfield, 2006).  The 
mercenaries then approached Tissaphernes, the initial focus of the campaign and the general 
Antaxerxes left with the problem of dealing with the Greek force, but he also refused and, in 
turn, the Greeks refused to surrender to him (Waterfield, 2006).  Ariaeus, whether giving good 
advice or acting in the interests of Antaxerxes, convinced the Greeks to move north, using the 
argument that they had stripped the country bare of supplies on inward march with Cyrus (Lee, 
2007).   
Now the more mundane implications of Cyrus’s absence became clear, as the Greeks had 
depended on Cyrus for planning their route and making supplies available (Lee, 2007).  The 
Persians initially guided and made supplies available to the Greeks, but that ended in treachery 
when Tissaphernes played on the rivalry between Clearchus and Menon (Hirsch, 1985) to 
capture the leading five Greek generals, including Clearchus, and killing 20 captains and 200 
hoplites that accompanied them to a dinner (Hutchinson, 2000).  Only one hoplite, Nicarchus 
returned to warn the Greek mercenaries of the incident—dying as he held his bowels in his hands 
(Warner, 1949).  The Greek’s initial reaction to this shock was to band together (Lee, 2007).  A 
subsequent council endorsed Xenophon as a leader and the decision to go north into the 
uncharted territory of the Karduchian mountains with the logic that it was easier to cross the 
Euphrates at its source (Waterfield, 2006). 
The Retreat 
The decision to retreat north bonded the Greek mercenaries together with the common 
purpose of surviving and returning home (Waterfield, 2006).  However, the mercenaries adjusted 
their tactics and invested to improve their capabilities as a military force.  First, the Greek 
mercenaries improvised their traditional phalanx formation to form a hollow square that 
surrounded their baggage train and camp followers with hoplites (Warner, 1949).  The 
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implementation of a hollow square, or plaison, drove other important changes.  To enable 
forming a hollow square with equal sides, the Greek mercenaries were redistributed to other 
units helping make ethnic divisions less distinct (Lee, 2007).  Next, the attacks from the rear 
resulted in the creation of a special unit of 600 hoplites to maintain the integrity of the formation 
as the force naturally spread out and contracted moving over rough terrain (Lee, 2007). 
Hollow square formations had been previously used by both Sparta and Athens with 
mixed success (Lee, 2007) and this change alone did not offer protection from Persian archers 
and slings.  Hoplites carried shields carried on their left, so soldiers on the right and rear of the 
formation were most vulnerable.  Consequently, they became the focus of attack and initially a 
Persian force of only 600 soldiers was able to slow the movement of over 10,000 Greek 
mercenaries to only a few miles a day (Lee, 2007).  The Persian light troops were able to engage 
the Greeks from long range and then disperse before they could be engaged in close combat by 
hoplites.  To counter continued Persian harassment, the Greeks implemented additional changes.   
Coinciding with a decision to burn their wagons, tents, and other baggage, the Greek 
mercenaries made a night march giving them a two-day respite from Persian harassment (Lee, 
2007).  Less baggage enabled faster movement and a smaller and more defensible camp, but it 
also was not sufficient to protect from Persian attack.  Therefore, the mercenaries formed 50 
cavalry soldiers from the best of the captured horses, and 200 slingers (Lee, 2007).  Slingers 
were considered less prestigious than hoplites, so a bonus was used to induce soldiers to 
volunteer as slingers (Warner, 1949).  The Greeks also used captured lead with their slings 
giving them a greater effective range compared to the stones used by the Persians (Waterfield, 
2006), though the Greek mercenaries later ran out of lead and resorted to using stones (Lee, 
2007).  These changes allowed the Greek mercenaries to reach the Karducian mountains. 
As the mercenary force entered the Karduchian mountains, the Persian army stopped its 
pursuit because it had accomplished the goal of getting the Greeks out of Persia.  Additionally, 
few of the Greeks were expected to survive, as no one had returned from a recent force of 
120,000 Persian soldiers sent into Karduchia (Warner, 1949).  Consequently, the going did not 
become easier and the Greek mercenaries continued to be harassed by hostile forces.  The rough 
terrain provided its own challenges and on the second day in the mountains the generals removed 
excess animals and camp followers as the mercenaries went through a narrow pass (Lee, 2007).  
The smaller army was an attempt to further increase mobility and reduce the supplies needed to 
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support it.  Still, harassment and the constant need to search for supplies combined to keep the 
Greek mercenaries moving (Lee, 2007).  
In continuing to move north, the Greek mercenaries faced new challenges.  For one, they 
had no maps.  The Greek mercenaries depended on scouts and hostages that limited knowledge 
of their march to only a couple of days (Lee, 2007).  At one point, when faced by a mountain 
pass guarded by hostile forces, two prisoners were questioned about another route (Warner, 
1949).  When the first repeatedly denied any alternative, his throat was cut in front of the other, 
and the remaining prisoner provided the Greeks another route through the mountains 
(Waterfield, 2006).   
Constant attacks threatened to separate the Greek force as they stretched out along 
mountain trails and river crossings. This led to innovative responses to attacks, including hiding 
behind trees when boulders were rolled downhill by defenders and maintaining forces on parallel 
high ground (Lee, 2007).  Another creative tactic the Greek mercenaries used was to switch the 
signals for charge and retreat to successfully limit the challenge of a contested river crossing 
(Warner, 1949).  Still, Greek losses the first few weeks in the mountains were comparable to the 
months they spent in Persia (Waterfield, 2006).  The Greek mercenaries also missed the 
opportunity to adapt Karduchian long bows whose arrows could pierce both Greek shields and 
armor, threatening hoplite usefulness, and peltasts simply used the recovered oversized arrows as 
javelins (Hutchinson, 2000).  Again, these adaptations helped the mercenary force move through 
the mountains.  The Greek mercenaries celebrated seeing the Black Sea with shouts of “the sea, 
the sea” that caused successive ranks to rush the crest of the final hill thinking initially they were 
under attack (Waterfield, 2006).   
The Sea, the Sea 
 Sighting the Black Sea offered the Greek mercenaries a false promise of the familiar and 
resulted in the return of internal dissension.  In one instance, Coeratades briefly assumed 
command of the Greek mercenaries by promising provisions, but he was unmasked as a fraud 
when the provisions proved inadequate (Hirsch, 1985).  In another case, the latent frustration of 
the mercenaries turned on Xenophon and he was tried for hubris—a serious charge in ancient 
Greece involving assault (Waterfield, 2006).  Xenophon’s accuser was a mule driver whom 
Xenophon struck during the march through the Karduchian mountains.  Xenophon defended 
himself by playing on the sympathies of the army for having left so many behind.  Xenophon 
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explained that he struck the mule driver after he had ordered him to carry a wounded soldier and 
that he later found the mule driver burying the soldier alive (Warner, 1949).  The mule driver’s 
rebuttal was that the wounded soldier still died to which Xenophon replied “we’re all going to 
die, but does that mean we have to be buried alive?” (Warner, 1949: 131).  Xenophon 
successfully refuted the charge, but that his behavior was questioned showed to all his actions 
were only condoned by the emergency of their circumstances and the emergency had passed.  As 
a result of the dissent, the remaining 8,200 Greek mercenaries splintered into three groups 
(Warner, 1949). 
However, the smaller mercenary groups were more easily attacked and resulted in 1,000 
Greek casualties in a single week (Waterfield, 2006).  The harried Greek mercenaries 
increasingly relied on superstition and ritual sacrifice to divine a way forward as they confronted 
both the familiar and unfamiliar.  Even when the mercenaries came upon Greek settlements their 
reputation preceded them and the mercenaries were often denied assistance and barred from the 
settlements.  Not only were the Greek outposts along the Black Sea not Greece, but the 
mercenaries themselves were changed from their experience.  Constant and varied battle had 
honed the mercenaries’ military skills making them a versatile, battle-hardened force (Lee, 
2007).  Since they had learned how to survive as soldiers, the journey of the Greek mercenaries 
ended similar to how it began.  In the spring of 399 BC, Spartan emissaries hired the 5,000 
remaining mercenaries under Xenophon and they were sent to Ionia to once again fight 
Antaxerxes (Lee, 2007). 
Case Analysis 
In organizational research, what is known to have happened is often less intriguing than 
the question: What might have been?  This is less true with the dramatic changes in the 
circumstances of the Greek mercenaries.  The reason we have their remarkable story is that they 
survived, and an analysis of their decisions must take this into account.  Still, one interesting 
question is whether the Greek mercenary force would have survived if Tissaphernes had not 
killed their generals. 
The treachery by Tissaphernes was aided by the rivalry between Clearchus and Menon 
that likely blinded them to the more important external threat to them and their men.  
Nicarchus’s name survives largely due to the dramatic nature of his delivering the news of the 
Persian treachery as his life literally slipped through his hands.  If there was doubt about the 
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mercenaries’ fate, it disappeared with the message of Nicarchus and their generals. The killing of 
their leaders also made the Greek organization less hierarchal, or flatter—an outcome with 
advantages in responding to change (Morris, et al., 2008; Schumpeter, 1934).  While the Greek 
mercenary generals did not have the chance to see whether they could effectively respond to the 
demands of the situation, it clearly shows that others within the mercenary force were able to 
emerge and lead them to safety.  As such, the experience of the Greeks suggests an under-
appreciated role of middle managers in responding to uncertainty.  Taken together the events 
largely support the proposition (P2) that middle managers are more likely to respond to 
uncertainty with needed innovations than top managers.   
 The response of the newly selected Greek generals to immediate and subsequent 
challenges consistently involved bricolage, or using available resources to find workable 
solutions (Nohria & Berkley, 1994).  For example, cavalry was created from captured horses, 
slingers were recruited and outfitted with lead shot, the mercenaries reduced their baggage and 
camp followers at the start of their retreat and upon entering the Karduchian mountains, a special 
unit of hoplites was formed to enable the hollow square formation, and so on.  In each case, these 
innovations pulled on ideas the Greeks were already familiar and resources on hand.  For 
example, Xenophon had cavalry experience (Hutchinson, 2000), and Sparta and Athens 
previously used hollow square formations.  Further, these changes largely focused on increasing 
the effectiveness of the core force of hoplites.  Again, constant battle over two years honed the 
Greek mercenaries into a formidable force with experience fighting different units in varied 
terrain.  However, the Greek mercenaries failed to incorporate Karduchian longbows that offered 
the potential to make the hoplite obsolete and instead used the recovered arrows as javelins—a 
familiar application.  These events largely support organizations trying to increase efficiency of 
current resources and those they are familiar consistent with developed propositions (P1a and 
P1b).  Still, it leaves open the question of whether organizations can successfully deal with 
revolutionary change.  Clearly, organizations need to develop processes to improve their 
capabilities while being mindful of how the same may also restrict them. 
Once the immediate threat of survival passed, the common goal driving coordinated 
action dissolved and suppressed divisions resurfaced.  Once reaching the Black Sea, their elected 
general Xenophon was associated with unpopular decisions, such as reducing the number of 
camp followers in Karduchia.  The loss of comrades left behind could now able to be felt and, 
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while they were gone, Xenophon was a ready scapegoat.3  Although Xenophon defended 
himself, the mercenaries still separated into three groups with lower survival rates.  While 
Xenophon retained leadership of one of the groups and led a 5,000 hoplite force recruited by 
Sparta to fight Antaxerxes again, it is unlikely that Xenophon ever held the same level of 
authority as he did during the retreat.  The mercenaries appeared aware of the adage that power 
corrupts and took action to put Xenophon on notice.  As such, it appears exercising power 
reduces its usefulness and creates divisions, supporting the final proposition (P3). 
CONCLUSION 
Although the increased pace of environmental change is widely touted, advances have 
significantly reduced the range of uncertainty that organizations face.  For example, modern 
conveniences including established financial markets, maps and navigation, communication, and 
transportation infrastructure are largely taken for granted.  Further, modern organizations rarely 
face true questions of survival as bankrupt organizations are often acquired and integrated into 
surviving organizations.  With this perspective, the Greek mercenaries and their response to 
uncertainty offer multiple lessons related to the propositions on managing uncertainty for 
management research and practice.   
Implications 
Management Research 
 Having survived their experience the Greek mercenaries returned with different 
perspectives and to circumstances different from what they had known.  However, the attributes 
that made them valuable to Cyrus remained and they were recruited by Sparta in a similar task.  
This suggests that both environments and organizations change, but core organizational 
capabilities can remain valuable.  The importance of organizational resources and capabilities 
has increasingly been recognized as important (Barney, 2001) and increasingly focuses on 
creating value from using resources together (Barney, 1997; Sirmon et al., 2007).  Further, 
resilient organizations need to know how to make use of available resource combinations 
(Carmeli & Markman, 2011).  Achieving long-term success requires organizations capable of 
constant adaptation, but existing perspectives of change range from rational explanations to the 
more haphazard application of politics do not appear adequate individually in explaining or 
                                                     
3 While information depends on Xenophon’s account, he seems to have been a good choice as general in that he was 
crucial in developing innovative responses to the challenges the Greek mercenaries faced. 
17 
 
preparing organizations for change.  Additional research is needed to explain how resources are 
developed and effectively used together in changing environments.   
Another implication for research from the current study is confirming the need to better 
understand the role of organization politics (Vaara, 2003), as understanding organizations 
requires paying attention to politics (Sayles & Stewart, 1995).  There is also an opportunity to 
find ways to use politics effectively and productively.  Constructive politics is generally 
considered a contradiction, but the elements of constructive politics include understanding 
tactics, considering motives, and an awareness of stakeholders and the environment (Butcher & 
Clarke, 2003).  Meanwhile, related theory and prescriptions for productive uses of organizational 
politics remain largely undeveloped.  However, simply ignoring politics or the use of power and 
influence misses the opportunity to understand and train people to develop this crucial skill.  The 
need to understand the effective use of power and influence is more acute when one accepts it 
may serve as the secret of success for individuals and organizations in adapting to change 
(Pfeffer, 1992).   
Management Practice 
 While the propositions and case do not reflect favorably on the Greek’s top management, 
the example reinforces that top management has a long-term influence on the success of 
organizations.  This is because top management sets the strategic context of organizations 
(Burgelman, 1983).  In the case of the Greek mercenaries, the formal military command structure 
and culture of individuality and showing initiative ultimately provided the foundation for the 
mercenaries to adapt.  The study also demonstrates the importance of developing an awareness 
of politics and associated tools, such as stakeholder management (Mitchell et al., 1997).  Politics 
can add an element of randomness that can improve an organization’s ability to adapt (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1998).  Another managerial implication from the case echoed in modern 
shortcomings involves the need to be ethical.  A telling example related to the case is that the 
double-crossing by Tissaphernes caught up with him, as he was later killed by Ariaeus, while 
preparing for a bath, on orders from Antaxerxes for disloyalty (Waterfield, 2006).  While skill 
alone may be insufficient to assure success, a lack of integrity can ruin even the most promising 
career.   
 A final implication for managers is the need to constantly evaluate their organizations 
size and scope.  The Greek mercenary force divested its baggage at least twice to become more 
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nimble and able to survive.  The Greek force of 10,000 was also able to stay together and survive 
Karduchia, when a larger Persian force of 120,000 that preceded them did not.  Still, when they 
broke into three segments after reaching the Black Sea, the mercenaries experienced some of 
their heaviest casualties.  This suggests that the size of an organization can be instrumental to its 
environment fit.  Further, the mercenaries’ survival was enhanced by diversifying form a hoplite 
force to a mixed force with cavalry and slingers.  This suggests that uncertainty can lead to 
legitimate errors that can be partially compensated for using diversification (Van de Ven, 1986).  
As managers gain experience with restructuring, managers will likely make better decisions 
(Barkema & Schijven, 2008).  An important skill as it is unlikely that an optimal match of 
organizational size and activity can be achieved as an organization environment changes driving 
the need for managers to repeatedly restructure their organizations.   
Limitations and Future Research 
 Research generally exhibits shortcomings that limit its influence, and often these 
limitations represent opportunities for additional research.  This study is no exception.  The 
primary limitation of the current study is the use of small samples (here a single case) can be 
flawed, but it is difficult to match the power of real events (March etal., 1991).  The choice of a 
critical event from antiquity was deliberate in that the juxtaposition of modern and ancient 
challenges helps to put modern challenges into perspective.  However, this goal also represents a 
potential bias in that in summarizing existing change research and building a case that has been 
examined by multiple books into a few pages opens the possibility of misinterpretation.  Still, the 
selection of a single case can facilitate inductive insights to better understand the phenomenon of 
interest (Carmeli & Markman, 2011; Yin, 1994).  Additionally, existing research frames 
propositions that gain meaning through comparison to actual circumstances.  While the 
circumstances of the Greek mercenaries are unique and unlikely to be repeated, organizations 
continue to face threats to their survival and the development of theoretical frameworks in this 
area is limited.   
The need for continued research on organizational change frameworks, development and 
use of resources, and politics has already been identified.  One research opportunity not 
mentioned is the need to explore incumbent organizations that face revolutionary change to 
outline means for adaptation.  An additional research opportunity relates to the impact of 
managerial ethics.  The fate of Cyrus and Clearchus may provide a morality tale on managerial 
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integrity; however, they may also have simply told the mercenaries what they wanted to hear.  It 
is possible that deception (like politics) has a role in organizational strategy, and exploring 
appropriate us of deception by managers and organizations represents an opportunity for 
research.  In closing, a commonly accepted management precept is that organizations must 
change and adapt, but an understanding of how to achieve this remains elusive. 
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Figure 1: Route of Xenophon and the Greek Mercenaries 
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